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Abstract
Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is a widely deployed paradigm for information dissemination
in a variety of distributed applications such as financial platforms, e-health frameworks and
the Internet-of-Things. In essence, the pub/sub model considers one or more publishers
generating feeds of information and a set of subscribers, the clients of the system. A pub/sub
service is in charge of delivering the published information to interested clients. With the
advent of cloud computing, we observe a growing tendency to externalize applications
using pub/sub services to public clouds. This trend, despite its advantages, opens up
multiple important data privacy and trust issues. Although multiple solutions for data
protection have been proposed by the academic community, there is no unified view or
framework describing how to deploy secure pub/sub systems on public clouds. To
remediate this, we advocate towards a trust model which we believe can serve as basis for
such deployments.
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1.

Introduction

Many online applications are provided as distributed services, either because they are
directed towards geographically-spread end users or because they connect a dispersed
enterprise environment. Providing timely, efficient and scalable information dissemination
is a requirement in all distributed applications. Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is a paradigm
for efficient information exchange in complex distributed systems. This communication
model follows the producer/consumer design pattern, considering one or more publishers
as source of feeds of information, and multiple subscribers as clients of this information.
Subscribers register subscriptions detailing their interest in the published data. A variety
of applications rely on this model, ranging from electronic commerce [8] to the
management of medical records [24]. A canonical example used in the literature [5, 14, 35]
is a financial application where publishers represent stock exchanges emitting information
on new stock quotes, and where subscribers are investors monitoring market changes. A
middleware layer situated between the publishers and the subscribers stores the
subscriptions, matches these subscriptions with the incoming publication stream, and
routes the relevant information to interested subscribers. Various designs exist for
implementing such a middleware layer starting from a loosely defined architecture in the
late 1980s [6] up to very recent blockchain-based frameworks [38]. The most common
design is to distribute the matching and routing operations across an overlay of broker
nodes. An overview of this model is given by Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Overview of a publish/subscribe architecture applied to a stock exchange use case

Both the structure of the information available in publications and subscriptions and
the matching model that the brokers allow have a strong impact on the design of a pub/sub
system. An overview of design variants is presented in a survey by Eugster et al. [14].
There are two dominant variants of pub/sub: topic-based and content-based. In topic-based
pub/sub subscriptions and publications are assigned to topics. Subscriptions match
publications for the same topic, forming channels of information. For instance, in the stock
exchange use case, messages could be assigned to a topic given by the stock symbol:
subscribers registering for the symbol “IBM” will receive all publications tagged “IBM”.
In content-based pub/sub matching is based on criteria on publications’ content. This
content is typically condensed in a publication header, structured in key-value fields
according to a publication schema. Subscriptions in the content-based model are
conjunction of constraints over the values for these publication fields. Following our stock
exchange example, a publication schema could include fields like:
“symbol” (type:string),
“value” (type:float),
“date” (type:date),
“variation” (type:float)

A subscriber could then register a subscription such as:
[(“symbol”=“IBM”) and (“value”>140) and (“date”=“3.2.2019”)]

The content-based model allows clients to select at a finer grain the information they
wish to receive. However, this model is also more challenging to implement, both from a
performance point of view (since the matching and routing operations are more complex)
but also, and perhaps more importantly, from the perspectives of privacy and trust.
Subscriptions include sensitive information revealing subscribers’ interests. This
information must be protected from prying eyes, yet allowing the matching operation to be
performed by the routing middleware. For instance, investors interested in price variations
of stocks do not want to divulge their financial strategies to other investors. In an e-health
scenario supported by pub/sub, publications of medical records are highly sensitive. An ecommerce application does not want the untrusted owner of the middleware infrastructure
to sell information about buyers’ interests to competitor merchants.
Data privacy and trust issues became more acute with the advent of cloud computing.
Multiple services including pub/sub middleware are externalized to public and shared
infrastructures. Cloud computing brings an economic advantage to service owners who are
able to reduce their deployment and operation costs. However, middleware services,
deployed on machines situated in a public domain are more prone to attacks [16, 29] and,
therefore, to privacy and trust breaches.
Multiple commercial frameworks and communication protocols implement the
pub/sub paradigm in their design. Examples include the Microsoft .NET microservices
framework [12], the MQTT protocol [39] for IoT integration, the instant messaging and
VoIP protocol XMPP [21], and Pusher Channels [40]. However, none of these frameworks
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considers by design data privacy and trust aspects. On the other hand, there exists an
extensive amount of academic research that addresses the protection of data in
subscriptions and publications, as well as associated performance/security tradeoffs [3].
These solutions generally focus on very specific technical aspects of a particular
mechanism, do not consider the wider context of trust in a practical scenario, and are not
used in practice. This state of fact is not an accident: designing secure and efficient pub/sub
systems using untrusted middleware is very hard.
The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, we provide in Section 2 more
specific details about trust and data privacy issues in current pub/sub deployments, and we
present an overview of current approaches for preserving data privacy in Section 3,
grouped according to their subject of application. Second, in Section 4, we propose a trust
model, which we believe can serve as basis for the successful integration of the
mechanisms described in Section 3. We conclude our study in Section 5.

2.

Trust and Data Privacy

In general, preserving data privacy refers to the capability of using the data of an entity
while protecting the non-disclosure preferences of that entity. The enforcement of such
preferences must be based on trust relations between entities and service providers. Privacy
preferences can refer to either hiding the identity of the entity - anonymity, or to hiding
data that might reveal some interests or other facts about the entity - confidentiality. We
discuss below these two data privacy and trust perspectives in the context of pub/sub
services.
2.1. The Anonymity Perspective
Anonymity in pub/sub is naturally preserved, to some extent, by the system design, which
decouples the clients of the service, the subscribers, from the publishers. A publisher does
not know to which of the service subscribers the published data is delivered, and a
subscriber does not know from which publisher it received a given publication. The
decoupled nature of the communication is enforced by the middleware providing the
pub/sub service. In most scenarios the provider of the pub/sub service is entitled to know
the identity of its clients or that of the data providers, and consequently trusted not to
divulge these identities.
The basic level of anonymity provided by decoupling is typically acceptable, given that
subscribers emit a request and expect receiving information only from the pub/sub service.
This is fundamentally different from other service models (i.e., electronic voting), where
the only purpose of the service is to process information originating from the clients. Of
course, situations could exist when stronger anonymity guarantees are necessary (e.g., a
free service for monitoring some patients’ state and notifying them about some developing
condition, where patients would not want to expose their identities). In Section 3 we
overview several techniques that can be used to provide such guarantees. However, in the
vast majority of use cases clients pay for the pub/sub service, which already implies
revealing their identity to the service. Therefore, the focus on data privacy typically lies
less with anonymity and more with confidentiality.
2.2. The Confidentiality Perspective
Data privacy, from a confidentiality perspective, refers to the protection against the access
to sensitive information in queries emitted by the system clients – in subscriptions, or in
sensitive information disseminated using the pub/sub service – in publications. Trust, in
respect to a node (machine) where the pub/sub system is deployed, refers to a degree of
confidence in the entities able to access the specific node and the sensitive data at that node.
Multiple degrees of trust can be defined, depending on the sensitivity of some specific data.
Similarly, multiple degrees of trust can be defined with respect to the different entities that
can access a specific node. For simplicity of the discussion, we consider, for now, a single
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node trust level. We say that a node where a distributed pub/sub system is deployed is
trusted if we have full confidence in all the entities able to access that node and read
sensitive data it holds. Similarly, we consider a node untrusted if we do not have
confidence in any entity able to access the node and read its sensitive data. In case of a
trusted node there is no need for data privacy. In case of an untrusted node, mechanisms
for enforcing data privacy are required. 1
As introduced in Section 1, trust and data privacy issues in pub/sub services become
more stringent with the externalization to public cloud infrastructures. Essentially clients
can trust the provider of the pub/sub middleware to properly operate the service, without
willingly leaking any sensitive data. However, when this pub/sub service is deployed on
virtual machines on a public cloud, multiple other entities, potentially with malicious
intent, can gain access to the respective cloud nodes, rendering these untrusted.

Figure 2. High-level overview of an attack scenario via VM co-location in the stock market use case

A first category of threats is represented by attackers who either have an interest in
finding subscribers’ intentions or in accessing a publications stream without permission. If
a virtual machine of an attacker is placed in the public cloud on the same untrusted node
as for the victim pub/sub service, a variety of side-channel attacks can be attempted for
leaking sensitive information [29, 36]. Figure 2 presents an overview of the threat scenario
adapted to our stock market example, where a malicious investor attempts to gain
information on competitors from co-located virtual machine. An empirical study
performed in 2015 [33] on the placement of virtual machines on U.S. regions of Amazon
EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure cloud infrastructures has shown that
an attacker using 10 to 30 virtual machine instances had a probability of co-residency on
the same node as a victim’s virtual machine that ranges from 0.3 to 1, depending on the
number of virtual machines run by the victim. A more recent study from 2017 [1],
conducted with the participation of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, devised a
mathematical model for computing the probability of co-residency for an attacker’s virtual
machine with a victim’s machine, confirming this threat.
A second category of threats, and subsequent interest in providing data privacy
guarantees, gained momentum following the “Snowden effect” [17] of global surveillance
disclosures. A subscriber might not be comfortable with knowing that his interests might
be spied upon by a governmental agency. Even though the provider of a pub/sub service
might be located in a country that is theoretically regarded as well-regulated from this
perspective (i.e., the European space with the adoption of the GDPR), if the provider is
using a public cloud infrastructure for his service, the machines where the service
effectively runs might be geographically located elsewhere, and under the legal jurisdiction
of another country. This may expose the infrastructure where the service resides to hidden
1

In a more general case, if multiple degrees of trust are defined at the level of one node, then privacy of
some data should be enforced against some entities able to access that node. We reference the
generalization in our trust model approach proposed in Section 4.
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surveillance from that country. This exposure is accentuated if the cloud provider
periodically migrates virtual instances across hosts located in different jurisdictions.
Both types of threats have a similar target: gaining access to sensitive data on untrusted
nodes. In practical deployments, a part of the pub/sub service can be externalized to a
public cloud for cost effectiveness, whereas the other part can be deployed on a private
infrastructure that belongs to the service operator, which is normally considered secure.
This, as well as different sensitivity levels of data, requires defining a more complex trust
model for the nodes in the system, which we propose in Section 4. Nevertheless, threats
can be addressed by implementing data privacy mechanisms on the untrusted broker nodes,
more precisely techniques for preserving confidentiality of subscriptions and publications.
The natural approach would be encrypting this data. The difficulty lies in simultaneously
maintaining the functionality of the pub/sub service. If the data cannot be accessed at the
level of the untrusted broker node, then the pub/sub matching cannot be performed.
Therefore, specific mechanisms are required. We provide an overview of the existing
approaches for such mechanisms in Section 3. Several general aspects should be
considered in relation with the practical use case when choosing a solution:
a) Expressivity of the pub/sub model. In topic-based pub/sub the matching operation is
simpler, implying typically only evaluation of the equality on topic. Therefore, it is
normally enough to provide support for confidential equality matching. Matching in
content/based pub/sub involves more complex operations over subscriptions’
constraints, such as numerical range evaluations, substring comparisons, etc.
b) Specific sensitivity of messages. Depending on the use case, data privacy might be
important for subscriptions, publications, or both. Most developed mechanisms take
in account both types of messages. However, depending on the trust assumptions,
selectively protecting only one type of messages might be acceptable and could
increase the cost-effectiveness of the solution.
c) Payload of publications. A publication always contains a payload in a topic-based
pub/sub scenario, including the effective publication content. In content-based
pub/sub this payload might be absent (e.g., in the stock market example, all
information on a quote can be included in the header fields used in matching). This
payload, when present, requires similar protection as the header. Since the payload is
not subject to the matching operation, standard encryption techniques can be used.

3.

Mechanisms for Data Privacy in Pub/Sub Systems

We now overview mechanisms that can be implemented for preserving data privacy in
pub/sub systems. We follow the two perspectives – anonymity and confidentiality –
discussed in the previous section. We also group these mechanisms according to their
specific subject of application. This allows us to establish a set of data privacy properties,
a notion which we further use in defining a trust model in Section 4.
3.1. Anonymity Mechanisms
Mechanisms for preserving anonymity in pub/sub have the purpose of protecting the
identity of subscribers and/or publishers by respectively hiding the source of subscriptions
and/or publications from an untrusted node. We can, therefore, define two data privacy
properties, according the subject protected by the mechanism: subscriber anonymity and
publisher anonymity. As discussed in Section 2, anonymity has less importance in pub/sub
systems due to the natural decoupling between publishers and subscribers, and also because
in many use cases subscribers are paying customers, whose identity should be known at

ONICA E., MERCIER H., RIVIÈRE E.

TRUST AND PRIVACY IN DEVELOPMENT OF PUB/SUB SYSTEMS

the broker node level for delivering the service 2. Most techniques that can be applied in a
pub/sub scenario are derived from more general techniques in distributed systems. We
overview the main approaches in the following.
a) Proxy forwarding and re-encryption. This mechanism relies on one or more trusted
third party proxy nodes that forward (and potentially encrypt [37]) the messages, and
send them on behalf of the original sources after removing their identity. Typically,
choosing from multiple proxy nodes can harden the system against brute force
attempts to identify the source via traffic monitoring. Due to the fact that the identity
of the sender is discarded, this technique is adequate mainly for publishers anonymity
(i.e., using the proxy for sending the publication to an untrusted broker node).
Subscribers anonymity would require maintaining a mapping history of discarded
source identities at the level of the proxy, for tracing back the route towards
subscribers. Since keeping such a mapping with the exact identifier of a subscriber on
a third-party proxy node could still be a vulnerability (and make the proxy itself a
target), a more cautious approach is to map the source domain of the subscription. This
domain can be represented by a private trusted infrastructure, which is under full
control of the service provider, and where a final mapping is kept for reaching the
client of the service. The objective is to disallow an attacker from tracing the identity
of the subscription beyond this trusted domain, up to the effective subscriber.
A disadvantage is the high cost of maintaining such a setup.
b) Onion routing. This is an alternative, more secure variation, to simple proxy
forwarding for ensuring publishers anonymity. It is based on the concept of mix
nodes [7], for which the most significant implementation is the TOR network [13].
Instead of a single proxy, an onion path of mix nodes can be used for sending an
encrypted publication to a pub/sub broker. Each mix in the path can only decipher the
next mix hop. Since the path must be fully known for the encryption at the source of
the message, this mechanism cannot be easily used to send the publication from the
untrusted broker up to the final subscriber without maintaining expensive persistent
channels.
3.2. Confidentiality Mechanisms
We now discuss confidentiality mechanisms of content-based pub/sub. Confidentiality in
the less expressive topic-based pub/sub can be provided by a subset of the content-based
mechanisms. As before we focus our discussion on protecting untrusted broker nodes
located in a public cloud where the pub/sub service middleware is deployed. We can define
a set of properties according to the subject of application of the confidentiality
mechanisms: subscription confidentiality, publication confidentiality and payload
confidentiality. The first two refer to the protection of the messages’ headers used for
matching by brokers, while the latter refers to the confidentiality of any extra payload that
a publication might contain.
Subscription and Publication Confidentiality
Most mechanisms are designed to provide both subscriptions and publications
confidentiality, therefore we overview these together. Typically, a form of encryption is
used allowing the untrusted broker node to determine the matching result without accessing
the sensitive content of the subscription or the publication header. Decryption is not always
provided since the final purpose is the matching result (only the publication payload is
2

We refer here to identity strictly from the perspective of the source of a subscription required as
destination for delivering the matching publications, i.e., the source IP address of a subscriber. The
individual identity of a subscriber client can of course be subject of anonymization at the level of a broker
node, depending on the agreement between the client and the service provider, using various techniques
(i.e., pseudonyms). However, this falls outside the scope of the effective operation of the pub/sub service,
since it does not interfere with the routing of the publications towards the subscriber.
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delivered to the subscriber after a match). However, when publications do not include a
payload, the information of interest for subscribers resides in the publication header fields,
in which case decryption must be supported. Since this case is similar to the payload
confidentiality we discuss it later. In the following we summarize the main categories of
mechanisms that provide confidential matching.
a) Specific cryptographic schemes. A series of cryptographic schemes were developed
for allowing an untrusted broker to match an encrypted subscription with encrypted
publications. Some of these schemes [9, 23] have roots in homomorphic encryption,
preserving an isomorphism between the encrypted comparison of subscriptions and
publications and the equivalent plaintext comparison. Other schemes [18, 20, 28, 32]
rely on domain mappings that permit translating any range or string comparison to an
equality comparison in the encrypted form. We surveyed in our previous work [25]
such encrypted matching schemes. The impediment of adopting such schemes in a
practical pub/sub scenario typically lies in the difficulty of implementing a necessary
key management solution. We discuss this issue in the final part of this section.
b) Standard cryptographic schemes and access control. Some of the proposed
mechanisms [2, 19, 34] rely on standard cryptographic protocols for protecting
sensitive fields in publications and constraints in subscriptions, which do not permit
matching these fields on untrusted broker nodes. The solutions typically define various
access control models, allowing the brokers to perform matching only over certain
non-sensitive fields according to the access control policies. Depending on the
solution, various levels of sensitivity for message fields (and respectively trust for
brokers) can be defined. A disadvantage of this approach is that matching over
sensitive fields is not allowed.
c) Trusted hardware support. Some recent CPUs offer the possibility to perform the
matching in hardware-protected memory zones such that the access can be restricted
even for the owner or operator of the physical machine, i.e., using the Intel SGX or
AMD SEV technologies [22]. This is a novel approach towards confidentiality in
pub/sub, with yet few implementations [27]. A limitation of the solution is its
dependence on this hardware support.
Payload Confidentiality and the Key Exchange Issue
As discussed in Section 2.2, payload confidentiality is typically ensured by using standard
encryption schemes. The publication payload is not subject of a matching operation on the
untrusted broker nodes. Therefore, no access is needed to the payload, so in theory any
end-to-end encryption is sufficient.
Symmetric encryption standards (i.e., AES [11]) are typically recommended due to cost
effectiveness. However, in this case the encryption key is secret and should be exchanged
by the two communicating parties. The pub/sub context decouples the communication
between the publisher and the subscriber. Normally it is impossible to know prior to
matching which subscriber will receive a certain publication. This creates a significant
difficulty in solving the required key exchange.
Using asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA [30]), where the publication payload could be
encrypted with the public key of a subscriber who then decrypts with an associated private
key, poses a similar problem despite the absence of key exchange. The publisher would
not know who the receiving subscriber is, and consequently whose public key to use in the
encryption. Besides this, public key encryption is typically costly and is applied only on
messages of small dimension.
Currently, establishing a key correspondence between publishers and subscribers for
payload confidentiality is one of the major open issues in privacy preserving pub/sub
systems. The issue is even more severe considering that it also applies to publication
confidentiality when the publication is only formed of the header used in matching, which
should be decrypted when reaching the subscriber.
The easiest way to approach the key exchange is by abandoning the complete
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decoupled nature of the system in favor of a partial coupling where a publisher would know
at least the group of subscribers who might receive emitted publications, and pre-exchange
a group encryption key with these. However, new issues arise:


Confidentiality breaches. The size of the group of clients should remain limited. Preexchanging a key with a larger group increases the chance of confidentiality breaches: a
malicious subscriber could try to intercept payloads sent to a different subscriber and
encrypted with the same key. Specific cryptographic techniques exist for efficient
dissemination of keys in groups preventing some breaches, such as broadcast
encryption [15] with tracing traitors [10] who would leak the key outside a trusted group.
So far, these techniques have been applied to the protection of secure pay-per-view
channels in media transmissions and for implementing digital rights management (DRM)
policies, where the encrypted data sent to the group does not differ from one client to the
other and where, therefore, a client of the trusted group would not be interested in spying
another client. Adapting such techniques to pub/sub is an open problem.



Limited scalability. One of the advantages of the decoupled nature of pub/sub systems is
the potential for scaling to large numbers of subscribers [31]. This is achieved through
various methods, some implying dynamic changes in the system such as work migration
from one node to another for load balancing [4] or the addition of new nodes (i.e., new
publishers). An initial mapping between publishers and subscribers due to a key preexchange would limit the flexibility of any potential changes and could consequently
impair scalability.



Potential anonymity breaches. A pre-exchange of encryption keys between known sets
of publishers and subscribers could expose their identity to one another. Although, as
discussed, this might not be an issue in some situations, in other use cases this would
breach anonymity properties as defined in Section 3.1. However, this problem is typically
easy to resolve by coordinating the key exchange through a trusted third party, which
guarantees anonymizing the identity of the key receiving nodes.

The key management in pub/sub systems also presents another difficulty, this time related
to subscription confidentiality. In a general context, a key used in the encryption of an
information stream must be periodically refreshed to resist brute force attacks. If encrypted
matching is the chosen mechanism for subscriptions confidentiality, the new key encryption
should also be applied to subscriptions previously stored by untrusted broker nodes. Otherwise,
the matching will not be possible after a key refresh since publications will be encrypted with
different keys. The naïve solution is that subscribers re-submit all subscriptions encrypted with
the new key. This can inflict an unwanted load on the system which might cause communication
and latency issues. Only few solutions have been proposed for solving this problem [26], but
these are highly dependent on the chosen encryption scheme.

4.

Towards a Trust Model for Privacy Preserving Publish/Subscribe

We believe that besides the issues identified in the previous section, a general reason for
the lack of adoption of mechanisms for data privacy in pub/sub systems is that only few
solutions consider the necessity of a trust model. Indeed, most solutions only focus on the
technical details of the proposed mechanism. In this section we lay the ground for a trust
model, which we believe can help in integrating mechanisms referred in Section 3 in a
practical deployment. The following elements compose this model:


Trust domain. In Section 2.2 we referred for the clarity of the discussion to a single
degree of trust. However, in practice, multiple degrees can be defined depending on
the sensitivity of data and the privacy needs of the use case. We consider one given
set of nodes grouped in the same trust domain, if the expectations in terms of privacy
preservation for these machines are exactly the same. A trust domain does not only
correspond to the machines it contains but also includes network links. If the
machines in a trust domain are trusted for not leaking private information, their
interconnection links are also assumed to guarantee a similar level of privacy.
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Strength of properties. The privacy expectations can be ensured via data privacy
mechanisms and modelled through the properties defined in Section 3: subscribers
and publishers anonymity, and subscriptions, publications and payload
confidentiality. Until now we mainly referred to a single attacker with a purpose of
spying on sensitive information on one untrusted node. However, if the attacker is
able to implement a colluding attack, i.e., accessing data on multiple nodes, then the
attacker can potentially gain a significant advantage against some specific
mechanisms for data privacy, which are not designed to resist to collusion (e.g.,
gaining the capability to derive encryption keys). Therefore, it is useful to specify in
addition to a required property in a trust domain, the needed strength for the
respective property, where strength specifies the colluding power under which the
property should hold. We formalize this in our model as tuples having the structure:
<property, strength>. We consider specifically the following variants:
a) <property, 0> identifies the case of a trust domain, where nodes are trusted
and the property must not be enforced (the attacker has no access);
b) <property, 1> identifies the case of a trust domain, where no collusion can
occur (the attacker’s access is strictly limited to at most one node);
c) <property, k> identifies the case of a trust domain, where collusion might
occur, with the attacker’s access limited to at most k >1 colluding nodes.
Ordering the properties permits establishing the general trust level of a trust domain
in comparison to other domains. More precisely, we can distinguish the following
cases for two domains A and B:
1) Equally trusted: if all trust properties and their strength associated to the trust
domain A are also associated to the trust domain B, and conversely.
2) Less (more) trusted: domain A is less (more) trusted than domain B if for
properties associated with domain B, domain A has at least one corresponding
property with higher (lower) strength, with the other properties being of equal
strength For instance a domain A with (<subscription confidentiality, 1>,
<publisher anonymity, 1>) is less trusted than a domain B with
(<subscription confidentiality, 1>, <publisher anonymity, 0>).
3) Direct comparison not possible: this is the case if different properties have
opposite associated strength, for instance if domain A has (<subscriber
anonymity, 1> <publisher anonymity, 0>) and domain B has (<subscriber
anonymity, 0> <publisher anonymity, 1>). In such instances most powerful
common properties can be defined: (<subscriber anonymity, 1> <publisher
anonymity, 0>). This set, as the rest of the ordering, is useful for deploying
privacy mechanisms across domains as discussed below.



Trust boundaries. Nodes running the pub/sub service might reside on different trust
domains, where different properties with different strength are required. For
preserving the appropriate strength of these properties, it might be necessary to
enforce privacy mechanisms, or respectively to remove their effect, when
publications and subscriptions cross the trust domains. For the purpose of modelling
these changes we define such domain crossing as a trust boundary. We consider two
types of such boundaries:
a) Hard boundary. This is the boundary that appears when crossing from a more
trusted domain to a less trusted domain. The properties required in the less
trusted domain must be enforced before reaching this domain;
b) Soft boundary. This is the boundary that appears when crossing from a less
trusted domain to a more trusted domain, requiring properties with lower
strength. Any stronger data privacy property can be disabled any time after
crossing the boundary.

ONICA E., MERCIER H., RIVIÈRE E.

TRUST AND PRIVACY IN DEVELOPMENT OF PUB/SUB SYSTEMS

When two domains require some properties that cannot be compared, the boundary
is associated with the set of most powerful common properties, as defined above.
These should be enforced when crossing into both domains for preserving trust.
In Figure 3 we present an example of our trust model elements following the course of a
publication on a simple deployment over five trusted domains and a non-trusted one.

Figure 3. Trust model over a pub/sub service deployment with five trusted domains and an untrusted domain. It
shows a publisher (P) generating a publication, which is then matched by an overlay of brokers (B) and routed to
matching subscribers (S)

The implementation of the model in practice would also require the presence of an external
trusted component called the Trust Relationship Authority, TRA for short. The responsibility
of the TRA is to match the trust domain properties to the privacy preserving mechanisms and
apply these mechanisms at trust boundaries. A more precise description of the operation of this
TRA requires a discussion about key exchange support between the domains, which as
presented in Section 3.2 is still an open problem and dependent on the actual mechanisms used.
We note that while the TRA can be simply considered as a centralized component, the
possibility of integrating it as a decentralized set of cooperating operators that would only run
on the most trusted domains of the infrastructure is also an interesting perspective, open for
future investigation.

5.

Conclusion

We have presented a study about the trust and data privacy issues and necessities in
publish/subscribe services, an important area of distributed systems designed for information
dissemination used in multiple use cases and environments. We have discussed aspects related
to data privacy from two perspectives: anonymity and confidentiality, and we have overviewed
the most important categories of mechanisms used for enforcing specific privacy properties.
Finally, we have defined the basic ground for a trust model, open to further development, but
which we believe to be an important step for integration of privacy mechanisms in pub/sub
service deployments.
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